In recent papers [10, 11] Krister Segerberg introduced Irrevocable Belief Revision, as closely related to AGM revision [2] . In this paper we present irrevocable belief revision in terms of an epistemic entrenchment relation. 1
Background
The AGM model [2] characterizes changes in the belief of a rational agent. AGM recognizes three different kind of change: expansion (that consists in adding a new belief), contraction (eliminating a belief from the belief corpus of the agent) and revision (adding new beliefs preserving consistency). Krister Segerberg [10, 11] argues that there is a distinction between actual belief revision and merely hypothetical belief revision, and to capture it, proposes a new model, closely related with AGM: Irrevocable belief revision. 2 In irrevocable belief revision, just as in the AGM model the beliefs of a rational agent are represented by a belief set K, a set of sentences in a language L. K is closed under logical consequence Cn, where Cn satisfies: A ⊆ Cn(A), Cn(Cn(A)) ⊆ Cn(A), and Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B) if A ⊆ B . We assume that Cn includes classical logical consequence, satisfies the rule of introduction of disjunction into premises and is compact. α is an alternative notation for α ∈ Cn(∅) and K+α for Cn (K ∪ {α}) .
is an arbitrary tautology, ⊥ the falsity constant, K ⊥ the inconsistent belief set 3 and K the set of all belief sets. Irrevocable belief revision also includes a second belief set V, that represents a set of 1 Full version of a contributed paper presented at the 6th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation (WoLLIC'99 ), http://www.di.ufpe.br/~wollic/wollic99, held at the Hotel Simon, National Park of Itatiaia, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, May 25-28 1999, with scientific sponsorship by IGPL, FoLLI, ASL, SBC, and SBL, and organised by Univ. Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) and Univ. Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Financial support was given by CNPq (Brazil), CAPES (Brazil), and Facoltà di Scienze della Univ. di Verona (Italy).
2 "Ordinary theories of belief change do not seem suited to handle the sort of hypothetical belief change that goes on, for example, in debates where the participants agree, for the sake of argument , on a certain common ground on which possibilities can be explored and disagreements can be aired. One need not actually believe what one accepts in this way. Nevertheless such acceptance amounts to what may be called a doxastic commitment, one that cannot be given up within the perimeter of the debate. Someone who no longer wishes to honour such a commitment may be described as in effect abandoning the debate, perhaps in order to initiate another debate with a different set of doxastic commitments." [10] doxastic commitments, which are treated as irrevocable.
Let C be the set of all complexes. Segerberg proposed the following axiomatic for irrevocable belief revision:
(*2) is redundant, since it follows from (*b) and (*1) 7 . We reproduce the original axiomatic. The following lemma follows trivially from the definition: 
Entrenchment-Based Irrevocable Revision
The notion of epistemic entrenchment was introduced in [3] by Gärdenfors to represent formally a preference ordering among formulae in a theory. The standard postulates of epistemic entrenchment are:
4 "Note that the irrevocable belief revision functions are regarded as binary functions, but they are just partially defined on the set C × L. Once the first argument has been fixed to be a given complex (V, K), the function is well defined for every language formula. Consequently, we can take irrevocable belief revision functions as a unary function * :
We conserve the binary notation for clarity of the exposition.
5 In a first approach, we tried to suppress V from the axiomatic, defining V = {β : K * ¬β = K ⊥ }. However, as John Cantwell points out, irrevocable belief revision possess historic memory, i.e., it does not satisfy:
For deep details of iterable functions see [1] . For example, suppose an agent that always prefers the newest beliefs rather than the oldest. Consequently,
6 idem footnote 4, * is defined for (Vα, Kα ). 7 This fact was pointed out by an anonymous referee of the Wollic 99, where this papers was previously presented.
To construct an entrenchment-based irrevocable revision, we can make use of (EE1)− (EE4), but replacing (EE5) with a modified version of maximality:
In the standard entrenchment ordering, the maximally entrenched beliefs are exactly the tautologies. I-maximality extends this property to the whole set V. Lemma 2.1 Let ≤ K be an entrenchment ordering on a belief set K that satisfies
To relate epistemic entrenchment with irrevocable revision we introduce the following definition, where we write α < β when α ≤ β and β ≤ α, and α = ≤ β when α ≤ β and β ≤ α:
Definition 2.2 Let ≤ be an entrenchment relation on a belief set K that satisfies (EE1) − (EE4) and (EEi5). * ≤ is an irrevocable entrenchment-based revision if and only if
β ∈ K α if and only if either ¬α ∈ V or α → ¬β < α → β. [7, 8] 
The last part of the definition allows * ≤ to be iterable. ≤ α represents the new entrenchment order after the revision by α. Additional properties of this postulate can be found in [9] .
Lemma 2.3
Let ≤ be an entrenchment relation on a belief set K that satisfies (EE1)− (EE4) and (EEi5). Let * ≤ be defined as in Definition 2.2. Then:
We introduce the following identity [6] to define irrevocable revision in terms of epistemic entrenchment: 
A Appendix: Proofs
The following properties will be helpful in the proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. We must prove that: (a) V is a belief set: Let δ ∈ Cn(V), we must prove that δ ∈ V. By compactness of the underlying logic there is a finite subset
For this purpose we are going to show that if β 1 ∈ V and β 2 ∈ V then β 1 ∧ β 2 ∈ V. The rest follows by iteration of the same procedure. It follows from (EE2) that
By repeated use of Part 1, we know that (a) (V α , K α ) is a complex: We must prove the following cases: K α is a belief set: This proof is quite similar to the proof of Lemma 2.1.a. Let δ ∈ Cn(K α ). By compactness of the underlying logic there is a finite subset
For this purpose we are going to show that if β 1 ∈ K α and β 2 ∈ K α then β 1 ∧ β 2 ∈ K α . The rest follows by iteration of the same procedure. It follows from
In the same way, by Property A.1, β 1 ∧ β 2 ) ). In the first case, we use (EE1) and ¬α < (α → β 1 ) to obtain ¬α < (α → (β 1 ∧ β 2 )) and in the second we use ¬α < (α → β 2 ) to obtain the same result. It follows that β 1 ∧ β 2 ∈ K α . Part 2. By repeated use of Part 1., we know that We must prove that K α = Cn(K ∪ {α}). We will prove this identity by double inclusion. For the first direction let β ∈ K α . We want to show that β ∈ Cn(K ∪ {α}), which can be done by showing that α → β ∈ K. by the definition of
and it follows by (EE4) that (α → ¬β) < (α → β). Hence, by the definition of
↔ β and the rest follows from the previous proof of ( * 5).
Equivalently if β. Let α and β. We have three subcases 8 : (a) ¬α < ¬β. It follows from ¬α < ¬β and (EE3) that ¬α = ≤ (¬α ∧ ¬β). Then ¬α ∈ V. We will prove that 
We will use double inclusion to prove this: For the first direction, let γ ∈ K . We have two cases: (a) ¬β ∈ V α . Then ¬β ∈ Cn(V ∪ {α}), from which it follows that ¬α ∨ ¬β ∈ V, then by the definition of
For the second direction let γ ∈ K (α∧β) . We have two cases:
. There are two subcases according to the definition of
, it then follows by (EE1) that β < α. We obtain a contradiction, hence the second case is not possible. The other direction can be proved by showing that
α ≤ β, contrary to the conditions. (b) Suppose to the contrary that β < α and β ∈ K ¬(α∧β) . There are two cases:
Proof of Theorem 2.5
. It follows by ( * 1) that K = K ⊥ and by ( * 4) α ∧ β ∈ V, then β ∈ V . ( * 1) and ( * b) yield β ∈ K ¬(β∧γ) . Then by (C ≤ * ), γ ∈ K ¬(β∧γ) and by the same reasoning we arrive at γ ∈ V. Hence by ( * 1) and
. Then by ( * 1) and ( * b), γ ∈ V, and it follows that β ∧ γ ∈ V, then by ( * 2) and ( * 4), β ∧ γ ∈ K ¬(β∧γ) . Since β ≤ γ and (C ≤ * ), β ∈ K ¬(β∧γ) . We will arrive at an absurd by proving (b1) α ∈ K ¬(α∧β∧γ) and
, it follows by ( * df ) and ( * 5)
. By hypothesis α ∈ K ¬(α∧γ) and by ( * 1) and ( * 2) α ∈ K (α∧¬β) ; hence α ∈ K ¬(α∧β∧γ) .
(b2) Due to the hypothesis condition α ∈ K ¬(α∧β) it is enough to prove that
, then by ( * 1) and ( * b) α ∈ V and consequently (α∧β∧γ) ∈ V; then by ( * 4)
. In the first case we already have what we need. In the second case, it follows from ( * 1) that (β ∧ γ) ∈ K ¬(α∧β∧γ) ; then by ( * df ) and ( * 5)
(EE3) We have three subcases: 
